One of the key features of modern blockchain platforms is the possibility of executing smart contracts, i.e. computer programs that transfer digital assets between users, according to pre-agreed rules. Crucially, the execution of smart contracts must be correct even in the presence of (a minority of) adversaries in the peer-to-peer network that maintains the blockchain. To enforce this property without a trusted authority, the nodes follow a consensus protocol, which determines which node can extend the blockchain at each moment. To this aim, nodes first collect a set of transactions from the network, representing the actions on the smart contracts required by users. Then, to compute the new state of the smart contracts, they put these transactions in sequence (in an arbitrary order), and execute them serially. Once this block of transactions is appended to the blockchain, the other nodes of the network validate it, by reexecuting the transactions in the same order. The serial execution of transactions does not take advantage of the multi-core architecture of modern processors, so contributing to limit the throughput of blockchains. In this paper we devise a static analysis technique for parallelizing the execution of transactions, in a formal setting based on Ethereum, the most widespread platform for smart contracts.
INTRODUCTION
Modern blockchain systems are fully distributed platforms which allow for the execution of smart contracts, i.e. computer programs that transfer digital assets between users without a trusted authority. One of the most used and studied platforms for smart contracts is Ethereum [13] , a decentralized virtual machine that runs contracts written in a Turing-complete bytecode language. Intuitively, an Ethereum contract is similar to an object in an object-oriented language: it has an internal state and a set of procedures to manipulate this state. Additionally, a contract controls an amount of crypto-currency, that it can exchange with other users and contracts. Users interact with the Ethereum blockchain by sending transactions, which represent procedure calls to contracts, and may possibly involve a transfer of currency from the caller to the callee. The sequence of transactions on the blockchain determines the state of each contract, and the balance of each user.
The blockchain is maintained by a peer-to-peer network of nodes, which follow a consensus protocol to determine, at each turn, who can append a new block of transactions to the blockchain. This protocol guarantees the correct execution of contracts, and ensures that all the nodes have the same view of their state. Currently, transactions are processed by thousands of nodes, which play either the role of miner or that of validator. Miners gather from the network sets of transactions requested by users, and execute sequentially their procedure calls to determine the new state of the blockchain. While doing so, they search for the solution of a cryptographic puzzle: the miner who solves it first gains the right to append its block of transactions to the blockchain; in exchange for its solution, the miner receives a reward in crypto-currency, collecting the fees attached to the user transactions.
Once a block is appended to the blockchain, validators re-execute all its transactions, to update the state of all contracts and the balance of all users. To do this, validators process the transactions exactly in the same order in which they occur in the block, since choosing a different order could potentially result in inconsistencies between the nodes.
As highlighted above, both miners and validators execute transactions in a purely sequential fashion. Although this is quite effective to ensure the consistency of the blockchain state, in the age of multi-core processors it fails to properly exploit the computational capabilities of nodes. The result is that the throughput and the scalability of the current blockchain systems are more limited than necessary. By enabling miners and validators to concurrently execute transactions, it would be possible to improve the efficiency and the throughput of the blockchain.
Contributions This paper proposes a static analysis approach to improve the efficiency of the execution of smart contracts in Ethereum, by exploiting concurrency. More specifically, our main contributions can be summarised as follows:
• We introduce a core calculus for smart contracts, inspired by Solidity, the most widely used high-level language for developing contracts in Ethereum. Our calculus, called TinySol, features a minimal imperative core, which we extend with a novel construct to call contracts and transfer currency. We formalise the semantics of TinySol in a big-step operational style. We show our calculus expressive enough to reproduce some typical quirks of Solidity, like e.g. reentrancy attacks.
• We formalise transactions as calls to contract procedures, and blockchains as sequences of transactions. We define the semantics of a blockchain as a function which maps each contract to its state. This semantics reflects the current serial implementation of Ethereum nodes, where transactions are evaluated in sequence, without any concurrency.
• We introduce two notions of swappability of transactions.
The first notion is purely semantic: two adjacent transactions can be swapped within a blockchain if doing so does not alter the semantics of the blockchain. This notion is undecidable, as a consequence of the Turing-completeness of TinySol. The
arXiv:1905.04366v1 [cs.PL] 10 May 2019
second notion, called strong swappability, is more syntactical: assuming a static analysis which safely approximates the sets of variables read/written by a transaction, we check a simple condition on these approximations, inspired by Bernstein's conditions [9] for the parallel execution of processes.
We show in Theorem 6 that strong swappability is strictly included in the semantic relation. Further, we prove that if we transform a blockchain by repeatedly exchanging adjacent strongly swappable transactions, the resulting blockchain is observationally equivalent to the original one.
• Building upon strong swappability, we devise a true concurrent model of transactions execution. To this purpose, we transform a block of transactions B into an occurrence net N # (B), a classic true-concurrent model of computation [33] . This occurrence net describes exactly the partial order induced by the swappability relation. We model the concurrent executions of B in terms of the step firing sequences (i.e. finite sequences of sets of transitions) of the occurrence net N # (B). Theorem 13 establishes that the concurrent executions of B and the serial one are semantically equivalent.
• We describe how miners and validators can use our results to concurrently execute transactions, exploiting the multi-core architecture available on their nodes. Remarkably, our technique is compatibile with the current implementation of the Ethereum blockchain, while the other existing approaches to parallelize transactions execution would require a soft-fork.
Summing up, our paper provides a formal backbone to study concurrency issues in Ethereum, spanning from a formal high-level language for smart contracts, to a model of Ethereum transactions. Because of space constraints, we relegate the proofs of our results, as well as auxiliary examples and results, to the Appendix.
RELATED WORK
Although the seminal idea of smart contract dates back to the 90s [37] , their first implementations on decentralized ledgers were put into practice in 2012 on Bitcoin [1] , and in 2015 on Ethereum [13] . Since then, the research has evolved along different directions; the most relevant ones for our paper are: (i) improvements of the execution of smart contracts; (ii) static analysis and verification of smart contracts; (iii) domain-specific languages for smart contracts. We briefly survey the literature along these lines.
Optimizing transactions execution A few works study how to parallelize the execution of smart contracts on Ethereum, [6, 18, 19] , using dynamic techniques adopted from software transactional memory. These works are focussed on empirical aspects (e.g., measuring the speedup obtained on a given benchmark), while we focus on the theoretical counterpart. In [18, 19] , miners execute a set of transactions speculatively in parallel, using abstract locks and inverse logs to dynamically discover conflicts and to recover from inconsistent states. The obtained execution is guaranteed to be equivalent to a serial execution of the same set of transactions. The work [6] proposes a conceptually similar technique, but based on optimistic software transactional memory. Since speculative execution is non-deterministic, in both approaches miners need to communicate the chosen schedule of transactions to validators, to allow them to correctly validate the block. This schedule must be embedded in the mined block: since Ethereum does not support this kind of block metadata, these approaches would require a "softfork" of the blockchain to be implemented in practice. Compared to these works, in which conflicts are detected dynamically, our approach detects potential conflicts by means of a static analysis. Since software transactional memory introduces a run-time overhead, in principle a purely static technique could allow for faster executions, at the price of a preprocessing phase.
In the permissioned setting, Hyperledger Fabric [4] follows the "execute first and then order" paradigm: transactions are executed speculatively, and then their ordering is checked for correctness 1 . In this paradigm, appending a transaction requires a few steps. First, a client proposes a transaction to a set of "endorsing" peers, which simulate the transaction without updating the blockchain. The output of the simulation includes the state updates of the transaction execution, and the sets of read/written keys. These sets are then signed by the endorsing peers, and returned to the client, which submits them to the "ordering" peers. These nodes order transactions in blocks, and send them to the "committing" peers, which validate them. A block T 1 · · · T n is valid when, if a key k is read by transaction T i , then k has not been written by a transaction T j with j < i. Finally, validated blocks of transactions are appended to the blockchain. Our model is coherent with Ethereum, which does not support speculative execution of transactions.
Static analysis and verification Driven by the proliferation of attacks to Ethereum contracts, which have caused major money losses, many researchers have developed analysis and verification techniques to make smart contracts more secure. Several papers focus on EVM, the bytecode language interpreted by Ethereum nodes, and target of the compilation of higher-level contract languages. The work [26] gives a partial formalisation of the semantics of EVM, and exploits symbolic execution to detect some common vulnerability patterns of EVM contracts. A similar goal is pursued by [38] , which, rather than symbolic execution, is based on the analysis of dependency graphs. The works [22, 23] formalise executable semantics of EVM, validated against the official Ethereum test suite; these semantics are the basis of static verifiers of EVM contracts, like e.g. [21] . The work [10] translates EVM into F * , and uses its verification tools to detect vulnerabilities. The work [24] uses the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [32] to verify the EVM code obtained by compiling a fragment of the Ethereum Name Service. The work [35] proposes a strongly typed intermediate language for contracts, which are modelled as Communicating Automata; this richer structure (compared to EVM), simplifies formal reasoning, making contracts more amenable to verification. Similarly to some of the above-mentioned works, also ours pursues a static approach to the analysis of smart contracts; however, our goal substantially differs from that of other papers, which are focussed on finding security vulnerabilities. Indeed, our goal is to use static analysis to compute the set of keys that are read and written by a transaction, called read/write sets. There are many papers in the literature proposing static analyses for this purpose. The paper [17] describes an analysis based on separation logic. The analysis is used to resolve conflicts in the setting of snapshot isolation for transactional memory in Java. When a conflict is detected, the read/write sets are used to determine how the code can be modified to resolve it. Also [15] presents a static analysis to infer read and write locations in a C-like language with atomic sections. The analysis is used to translate atomic sections into standard lock operations. Our work differs from [15, 17] , because our goal is not to define a new analysis for read/write sets, but given such an analysis, to leverage it for determining which transactions can be run concurrently.
Domain-specific languages The most common high-level language for developing Ethereum contracts is Solidity [3], a Javascriptlike language officially supported by the Ethereum Foundations. Inspired by some harmful patterns appearing in Solidity contracts [7] , a few works have proposed domain-specific contract languages, with the goal of improving their security. The languages proposed in [11, 34] are targeted to the financial contracts of [25] , which are compiled, respectively, to Ethereum and to the Cardano blockchain. The works [27, 28] model smart contracts as finite automata with guarded transitions, and translate them into Solidity. Further, [28] develops a verification technique for safety and liveness properties on these models, based on a translation to NuSMV, the input language of the nuXmv symbolic model checker [14] . The correctness of this technique is supported by a formalisation of the semantics of a subset of Solidity. The work [16] proposes Featherweight Solidity (FS), a formalisation of some key features of Solidity in the style of Featherweight Java, including a type system which detects some run-time errors. FS features a richer syntax compared to our TinySol: actually, our design choice was to start from a basic imperative language, and extend it with a single contract-oriented primitive. A further difference is that FS models blockchains as functions from contract identifiers to states; instead, we represent a blockchain as a sequence of transactions, and then we reconstruct the state by giving a semantics to this sequence. In this way we are able to reason about concurrent executions of transactions.
A CORE CALCULUS FOR CONTRACTS
In this section we formalise Ethereum contracts in a core calculus, that we call TinySol (for "Tiny Solidity"). Besides minimal imperative features, like e.g. assignment, conditionals and loops, TinySol has contract-specific features for sending currency and calling contracts. We first formalise the syntax and semantics of contracts in Sections 3.1 and 3.2; then in Section 3.3 we introduce blockchains, defining how transactions affect the state of contracts. We discuss the main differences between TinySol and Solidity in Section 6.
Syntax of contracts
We assume a set Val of values v, k, . . ., a set Const of constant names x, y, . . ., a set of procedure names f, g, . . .. and a set Addr of addresses X, Y, . . ., partitioned into account addresses A, B, . . . and contract addresses C, D, . . .. We write sequences in bold, e.g. v is a sequence of values; ϵ is the empty sequence. We use n, n ′ , . . . to range over N, and b, b ′ , . . . to range over boolean values.
A contract is a finite set of terms of the form f(x ){S }, where S is a statement, with syntax in Figure 1 . Intuitively, each term f(x ){S } represents a procedure of the contract, where f is the procedure name, x are its formal parameters (omitted when empty), and S is the procedure body. Each contract has a key-value store, which we model as a partial function from keys k ∈ Val to values v ∈ Val.
Statements extend those of a basic imperative language with three constructs inspired by Solidity:
• throw raises an uncatchable exception, rolling-back the state;
• k:=E updates the store, binding the key k to the value denoted by the expression E; • X : f(v)$n calls the procedure f (with actual parameters v) of the contract at address X, transferring n units of currency to X. The expressions used within statements (Figure 1 ) can be constants (e.g., integers, booleans, strings), addresses, and operations between expressions. We assume that all the usual arithmetic, logic and cryptographic operators are provided (since their definition is standard, we will not detail them). The expression ?k denotes the value bound to the key k in the contract store (when k is unbound, ?k evaluates to the "undefined" value, written ⊥). The expression X : E evaluates E in the context of the address X. For instance, X : ?k denotes the value bound to k in the store of X.
We assume a mapping Γ from addresses to contracts, such that Γ(A) = {f skip (){skip}} for all account addresses A. This allows for a uniform treatment of account and contract addresses: indeed, calling a procedure on an account address A can only result in a pure currency transfer to A, since the procedure can only perform a skip (see Section 3.2).
We further postulate that: (i) expressions and statements are well-typed: e.g., guards in conditionals and in loops have type bool; (ii) the procedures in Γ(C) have distinct names; (iii) the key balance cannot stay at the left of an assignment; (iv) the constant names sender, value cannot stay in the formal parameters of a procedure.
We use the following syntactic sugar. For a call X : f(v)$n, when there is no money transfer (i.e., n = 0) we just write it as X : f(v); when the target is an account address A (so, the call is to the procedure f skip ), we write it as A$n.
Semantics of contracts
A state σ : Addr → (Val ⇀ Val) maps each address to a key-value store, i.e. a partial function from values (keys) to values. When a key k is not bound to any value in σ X, we write σ X k = ⊥. We postulate that dom σA = {balance} for all account addresses A, and dom σC ⊇ {balance} for all contract addresses C. A qualified key is a term of the form X.k. We write σ(X.k) for σXk; we use p, q, . . . to range over qualified keys, and P, Q, . . . to range over sets of qualified keys. We denote with P the set of all qualified keys.
A state update π : Addr ⇀ (Val ⇀ Val) is a substitution from qualified keys to values; we denote with { v /X.k } the state update which maps X.k to v. We define keys(π) as the set of qualified keys X.k such that X ∈ dom π and k ∈ dom πX. We apply updates to states as follows:
We define the following auxiliary operators on states:
Intuitively, σ + X : n updates the state σ by increasing the balance of X of n currency units. Definition 1 gives the operational semantics of statements, in a big-step style. The semantics of a statement S is parameterised over a state σ, an address X (the contract wherein S is evaluated), and an environment ρ : Const ⇀ Val, used to evaluate the formal parameters as well as the special names sender and value. Note that executing S may affect both the store of X and, in case of procedure calls, also the store of other contracts. Instead, the semantics of an expression is a value; so, expressions have no side effects. We assume that all the semantic operators are strict, i.e. their result is ⊥ if some operand is ⊥.
Definition 1 (Semantics of statements). We denote by S X σ, ρ the semantics of a statement S in a given state σ, environment ρ , and address X, where the partial function · X σ, ρ is defined by the inference rules in Figure 2 .
We briefly comment the rules in Figure 2 . The semantics of expressions is straightforward; note that we use op to denote syntactic operators, and op for their semantic counterpart. The environment ρ is used to evaluate constant names x , while the state σ is used to evaluate store lookups ?E. The semantics of statements is mostly standard, except for the last rule. A procedure call E 0 : f(E 1 )$E 2 within X has a defined semantics iff: (i) E 0 evaluates to an address Y; (ii) E 2 evaluates to a non-negative number n, not exceeding the balance of X; (iii) the contract at Y has a procedure named f (with formal parameters x ; (iv) E 1 evaluates to a sequence of values (whose length matches that of x ). If all these conditions hold, then the procedure body S is executed in a state where X's balance is decreased by n, Y's balance is increased by n, and in an environment where the formal parameters are bound to the actual ones, and the special names sender and value are bound, respectively, to X (the caller) and n (the value transferred to Y).
Example 1 (Wallet). Consider the following procedures of the contract at address C: f() {if sender = A then skip else throw} g(x, y) {if sender = A && value = 0 && ?balance ≥ x then y$x else throw}
The procedure f allows A to deposit funds to the contract; dually, g allows A to transfer funds to other addresses. The guard sender = A ensures that only A can invoke the procedures of C; calls from other addresses result in a throw, which leaves the state of contract C unchanged (in particular, the throw reverts the currency transfer from sender to C). Additionally, the procedure g checks that no currency is transferred along with the contract call (value = 0), and that the balance of C is enough (?balance ≥ x ).
Let S g = if b then y$x else throw, where b is defined as: sender = A && value = 0 && ?balance ≥ x . Let σ be such that σCbalance = 3, and let ρ = { A /sender, 0 /value, 2 /x, B /y }. We evaluate S g C σ, ρ :
Example 2 (Reentrancy). Consider the following procedures:
Intuitively, f first calls g, and then transfers value units of currency to the address x . The procedure g attempts to change the recipient of the currency by calling back f, setting the parameter x to B. We show below that this attack fails. Let S = C : f(A, true)$1. We evaluate S X σ, ρ as follows, for all σ and ρ such that σCbalance = 1:
where σ ′ is obtained as follows:
So, g has failed its attempt to divert the currency transfer to B. Let σ be such that σCbalance = n ≥ 1 and σCk = ⊥, and let ρ = { D /sender, 0 /value}, ρ ′ = { C /sender, 1 /value}. Let S f and S g be the bodies of f and g, respectively. We have:
D has drained all the currency from C. The famous "DAO Attack" on Ethereum, which caused a huge loss of currency in June 2016, exploited this kind of vulnerability [2, 7] .
Example 4 (Two-players lottery). In Figure 3 we code in TinySol a two-players lottery, inspired by the ones in [5, 30] . The players p1 and p2 bet 1 unit of currency each; additionally, they deposit 2 units of currency as collateral, which are used as compensation in case of dishonest behaviour. The procedure join allows the players to join the lottery; the parameter h is the hash of a secret, used to implement a timed commitment protocol [12, 20, 36] . The check h = ?h1 at line 7 serves to avoid an attack where the second player replays hash of the first one. The procedure leave allows the first player to leave the lottery, if no other player joins before time t0. Note that time is provided by an oracle, modelled by the contract Clock. The procedure reveal allows players to reveal their secrets: when this happens, the player redeems her collateral. Finally, the procedure win determines the winner of the lottery, who will collect the bets. If both players have revealed their secrets, then the winner is p1 or p2, depending on the parity of the sum of the secrets. Otherwise, one player can redeem the bets if she has revealed her secret and the deadline t0 has passed. 
Transactions and blockchains
A transaction 2 T is a term of the form:
Intuitively, A is the address of the caller, C is the address of the called contract, f is the called procedure, n is the value transferred from A to C, and v is the sequence of actual parameters. We denote with Tx the set of all transactions. We give the semantics of transactions in Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Semantics of transactions). We denote the semantics of T in σ as T σ , where the function · σ is defined by the rules in Figure 4 .
We briefly comment the rules in Figure 4 . The semantics of a transaction
Figure 4: Semantics of transactions.
a new state σ ′ . Rule [Tx1] handles the case where the transaction is successful: this happens when A's balance is at least n, and the procedure call terminates in a non-error state. Note that n units of currency are transferred to C before starting to execute f, and that the names sender and value are set, respectively, to A and n. Instead, rule [Tx2] applies either when A's balance is not enough, or the execution of f fails (this also covers the case when f does not terminate). In these cases, T does not alter the state, i.e. σ ′ = σ.
Example 5. Recall the contract C from Example 1, and let:
Let S f = if sender = A then skip else throw be the body of procedure f. Let σ be such that σAbalance = 5 and σCbalance = 0. By rule [Tx1] we have that:
Now, let σ ′ = σ − A : 3 + C : 3. By rule [Tx1] we have that:
If now we evaluate T 1 in σ ′′ = σ ′ − C : 2 + B : 2, by rule [Tx2] we obtain
A blockchain B is a finite sequence of transactions; we denote with ϵ the empty blockchain. The semantics of a blockchain is obtained by folding the semantics of its transactions (Definition 3). Note that erroneous transactions can occur within a blockchain, but they have no effect on its semantics (as rule [Tx2] makes them identities w.r.t. the append operation). We assume that in the initial state of the blockchain, denoted by σ ⋆ , each address X has a balance n ⋆ X ≥ 0, while all the other keys are unbound.
Definition 3 (Semantics of blockchains). The semantics of blockchains is defined inductively as follows:
We write B for B σ ⋆ , where σ ⋆ X = { n ⋆ X /balance}. We say that a state σ is reachable if σ = B for some B.
SWAPPING TRANSACTIONS
In this section we define when two transactions can be swapped. Intuitively, this happens when, given any blockchain, the order in which we append the two transactions is immaterial to determine the new state of the blockchain. More precisely, we require that the resulting states are observationally equivalent, i.e. they agree on the values associated to all the qualified keys. We formalise below a slightly more general notion of equivalence, which is parameterised on a set of qualified keys P over which we require the agreement.
Definition 4 (Observational equivalence). For all P ⊆ P, we define the relation ∼ P between blockchain states as follows:
We say that σ and σ ′ are observationally equivalent, in symbols σ ∼ σ ′ , when σ ∼ P σ ′ holds for all P.
The following lemma ensures that ∼ P is an equivalence relation, and that it is preserved when narrowing the set P.
We extend the semantic relation ∼ to syntactic entities (blockchains), by passing through their semantics. For all P, we define the relation ∼ P between blockchains as follows:
and we write B ∼ B ′ when B ∼ P B ′ holds for all P. The relation that ∼ is a congruence with respect to the append operation, i.e. if B ∼ B ′ then we can replace B with B ′ in a larger blockchain, preserving its semantics.
We say that two transactions are swappable when exchanging their order preserves observational equivalence.
Definition 5 (Swappability). Two transactions T T
Example 6. Consider the following procedures:
of a contract at address C, and consider the transactions:
We have T 0 ⇄ T 2 and T 1 ⇄ T 2 , but T 0 ̸ ⇄ T 1 (see Figure 5 ).
We shall use the theory of trace languages originated from Mazurkiewicz's works [29] to study observational equivalence under various swapping relations. For convenience, we fix the alphabet of trace languages as the set Tx of all transactions.
Definition 6 (Mazurkiewicz equivalence). Let I be a symmetric and irreflexive relation over Tx. The Mazurkiewicz equivalence ≃ I is the least congruence in the monoid Tx * such that, for all T, T ′ ∈ Tx:
The following theorem establishes that a blockchain can be transformed into an observationally equivalent one by a finite number of exchanges of adjacent swappable transactions.
Figure 5: Proofs for Example 6. A transition T from σ can be taken only if the guard below the arrow is satisfied in σ.
Example 7. By Theorem 3, we can rearrange the transactions in Example 6 as follows:
, starting from a state σ such that σAbalance = 2 and σCx = 0).
Note that the converse of Theorem 3 does not hold: indeed, B ≃ ⇄ B ′ requires that B and B ′ have the same length, while B ∼ B ′ may also hold for blockchains of different length (e.g., B ′ = BT, where T always throws an exception).
Since TinySol is Turing-equivalent, we have the following:
Safe approximations of read/written keys We devise a static approach to detect when transactions are swappable. To this purpose, we independently analyse the code of the procedures called by transactions, to over-approximate the set of read and written keys. We then check a simple condition on these approximations (Definition 9), which ensures that the transactions can be swapped. Since static analyses to over-approximate read and written variables are quite standard [31] , here we just rely on such analyses, by only requiring their correctness. We define below when a set of qualified keys P is a safe approximation of the keys read/written by T. Intuitively, Definition 7 says that a set P safely approximates the keys written by T when T does not alter the state of the keys not in P. Instead, P safely approximates the keys read by T when, given two blockchains B and B ′ , if BT and B ′ T differ on some key, but B and B ′ agree on that key, then B and B ′ must differ on some keys in P.
Definition 7 (Safe approximation of read/written keys). Given a set of qualified keys P and a transaction T, we define:
where f(){B$1} is a procedure of C. The execution of T affects the balance of A, B and C; however, C.balance is first incremented and then decremented, and so its value remains unchanged. Then, {A.balance, B.balance} |= w T, and it is the smallest safe approximation of the keys written by T. To prove that P = {A.balance} |= r T, assume two blockchains B and B ′ and a set of keys Q such that B ∼ P B ′ and B ∼ Q B ′ . If B Abalance < 1, then by [Tx2] we have BT = B . Since B ∼ P B ′ and B ∼ Q B ′ , then also B ′ Abalance < 1, and so by [Tx2] we have B ′ T = B ′ . Then, BT ∼ P B ′ T and BT ∼ Q B ′ T. Otherwise, if B Abalance = n ≥ 1, then by [Tx1] the execution of T transfers one unit of currency from A to B. So BT Abalance = n − 1, and since B ∼ P B ′ and B ∼ Q B ′ hold, we have that B ′ T Abalance = n − 1. Therefore, we conclude that P |= r T.
The following item states that widening a safe approximation (either of read or written keys) preserves its safety. Further, the intersection of two safe write approximations is still safe. From this, it follows that there exists a least safe approximation of the keys written by a transaction.
The following example shows that part (b) of Lemma 5 does not hold for read approximations. Note that, in any reachable state σ, it must be σCk = σCk ′ . Let Q be such that B ∼ Q B ′ , and let σ = B , σ ′ = B ′ , n = σCbalance, and n ′ = σ ′ Cbalance. Appending T to B and B ′ will result in:
If B ∼ {k } B ′ , then the conditions σCk A and σ ′ Ck A are equivalent. Therefore, BT = T σ ∼ Q T σ ′ = B ′ T , and so we have proved that {k } |= r T. Similarly, we obtain that {k ′ } |= r T, since k and k ′ are always bound to the same value. Note however that {k }∩{k ′ } = ∅ is not a safe approximation of the keys read by T. For instance, if σCk = A σ ′ Ck ′ and σCbalance = σ ′ Cbalance, then appending T to B or to B ′ results in states which differ on the balance of C.
Strong swappability We now show how safe approximations of the read/written keys can be used to detect when two transactions are swappable. We define a static analysis that checks whether the two transactions T and T ′ operate on disjoint portions of the blockchain state. To achieve that, we recast in our setting Bernstein's conditions [9] for the parallel execution of processes: it suffices to check that the set of keys written by T is disjoint from those written or read by T ′ , and vice versa. When this happens we say that the two transactions are strongly swappable.
Definition 8 (Strong swappability). We say that two transactions T T ′ are strongly swappable, in symbols T#T ′ , when there exist P w , P ′ w , P r , P ′ r such that P w |= w T, P ′ w |= w T ′ , P r |= r T, P ′ r |= r T ′ , and:
Example 10. Consider two contract addresses C 1 and C 2 that, respectively, are associated with the following procedures:
and consider the following transactions:
where A, B, and F are account addresses. To prove that T 1 #T 2 , consider the following safe approximations of the written/read keys of T 1 and T 2 , respectively:
, the two transactions are strongly swappable. Now, let:
and the following safe approximations W 3 and R 3 :
Since W 1 ∩ W 3 ∅ W 2 ∩ W 3 , then neither T 1 , T 3 nor T 2 , T 3 are strongly swappable.
Example 11 (Lottery, revised). Recall TinyLottery from Example 4, and consider the following transactions:
where A B. It does not hold that T r1 #T r2 : indeed, by inspecting the reveal procedure we see that any P such that P |= w T r1 or P |= w T r2 must contain TinyLottery.balance, s 1 and s 2 . Figure 6 shows a slightly modified lottery, where reveal transactions are strongly swappable. Assume now that T r1 and T r2 operate on TinyLottery2, and define the following sets of keys, where C = TinyLottery2:
Since the above sets are safe approximations, and (P 1 w ∪ P 1 r ) ∩ P 2 w = ∅ = (P 2 w ∪ P 2 r ) ∩ P 1 w , we conclude that T r1 #T r2 . Figure 6 : A variant of the lottery contract. We use strings as keys, and we use the operatorˆto concatenate strings. Addresses are implicitly treated as strings when needed.
The following theorem ensures the soundness of our static analysis, i.e. that whether two transactions are strongly swappable, then they are also swappable.
The converse implication of Theorem 6 does not hold, as witnessed by the following example.
Example 12 (Swappable transactions, not strongly). Let C be the address of a contract with the following procedures: f 1 (){if sender = A&&?k 1 = 0 then k 1 :=1 else throw} f 2 (){if sender = B&&?k 2 = 0 then k 2 :=1 else throw} and consider the following transactions:
To prove that T 1 ⇄ T 2 we have two cases. First, consider a state σ such that σAbalance > 1, σBbalance > 1, σCbalance = n, σCk 1 = 0 and σCk 2 = 0. We have that:
In the second case, let σ be such that σAbalance < 1, or σBbalance < 1, or σCk 1 0, or σCk 2 0. It is not possible that the guards in f 1 and f 2 are both true, so T 1 or T 2 raise an exception, leaving the state unaffected. Then, also in this case we have that T 1 T 2 σ = T 2 T 1 σ , and so T 1 and T 2 are swappable. However, they are not strongly swappable if there exist reachable states σ, σ ′ such that σCk 1 = 0 = σ ′ Ck 2 . To see why, let W 1 = {A.balance, C.balance, C.k 1 }. From the code of f 0 we see thatW 1 is the least safe over-approximation of the written keys of T 1 (W 1 |= w T 1 ). This means that every safe approximation of T 1 must include the keys ofW 1 . Similarly,W 2 = {B.balance, C.balance, C.k 2 } is the least safe over-approximation of the written keys of T 2 (W 2 |= w T 2 ). Since the least safe approximations of the keys written by T 1 and T 2 are not disjoint, T 1 #T 2 does not hold.
Theorem 7 states that the Mazurkiewicz equivalence ≃ # is stricter than ≃ ⇄ . Together with Theorem 3, this implies that if a blockchain B is transformed into B ′ by exchanging adjacent strongly swappable transactions, then B and B ′ are observationally equivalent.
Note that Definition 8 requires to check the existence of safe approximations which satisfy the disjointness condition (1). However, the Turing-equivalence of TinySol implies that finding such approximations is not always computable, and so:
Parameterised strong swappability Definition 8 establishes that two transactions are strongly swappable, independently of a specific static analysis used to obtain the safe approximations of read/written keys: it is sufficient that such an analysis exists. Assuming we fix such static analyses, we can parameterise strong swappability over them. To this purpose, we represent a static analysis as a function from transactions to sets of qualified keys, requiring it to be a safe approximation. Formally, we say that W is a static analysis of written keys when W (T) |= w T, for all T; similarly, R is a static analysis of read keys when R(T) |= r T, for all T.
Definition 9 (Parameterised strong swappability). Let W and R be static analyses of written/read keys. We say that T, T ′ are strongly swappable w.r.t. W and R, in symbols T# W R T ′ , if:
Note that an effective procedure for computing W and R gives an effective procedure to determine whether two transactions are (strongly) swappable.
Lemma 9. For all static analyses W and R:
From the inclusion in item (i) of Lemma 9 and from Theorem 7 we obtain the following:
TRUE CONCURRENCY FOR BLOCKCHAINS
In this section we develop a true concurrent model of transactions execution, and we show how to exploit it to improve the performance of miners and validators. The underlying idea is to transform a block of transactions into an occurrence net, a classic true-concurrent model of computation [33] . To this purpose, this transformation exploits a swappability relation, like e.g. the parameterised strong swappability # W R introduced in Section 4. The obtained occurrence net describes exactly the partial order induced by the swappability relation: any concurrent execution which respects this partial order is guaranteed to be equivalent to the serial execution of the block (Theorem 13). We then show how miners and validators can exploit this result to concurrently execute transactions, using the multi-core architecture available on their nodes.
From blockchains to occurrence nets We now introduce our transformation from blocks of transactions to occurrence nets. We start by recapping the notion of Petri net [33] . A Petri net is a tuple N = (P, Tr, F, m 0 ), where P is a set of places, Tr is a set of transitions (with P ∩ Tr = ∅), and F : (P × Tr) ∪ (Tr × P) → N is a weight function. The state of a net is given by a marking, i.e. a multiset m : P → N defining how many tokens are contained in each place; we denote with m 0 the initial marking.
The behaviour of a Petri net is specified as a transition relation between markings: intuitively, a transition t is enabled at m when each place p has at least F(p, t) tokens in m. When an enabled transition t is fired, it consumes F(p, t) tokens from each p, and produces F(t, p ′ ) tokens in each p ′ . Formally, given x ∈ P ∪ Tr, we define the preset • x and the postset x • as multisets: • x(y) = F(y, x), and x • (y) = F(x, y). A transition t is enabled at m when • t ⊆ m.
The transition relation between markings is defined as m t − → m ′ , where t is enabled and m ′ = m − • t + t • . We say that t 1 · · · t n is a firing sequence from m to m ′ when m
A marking m ′ is reachable from m when there exists a firing sequence from m to m ′ ; we say that m ′ is reachable when it is reachable from m 0 .
We also recap two special cases of Petri nets. A safe net is a Petri net where each reachable marking is a set, i.e. m(p) ≤ 1 for all reachable markings m and for all places p. An occurrence net is a safe net enjoying the following additional conditions: (i) • t ∅ and |t • | = 1, for all t; (ii) |p • | ≤ 1 for all p; (iii) | • p| = 1 if p m 0 , and | • p| = 0 if p ∈ m 0 ; (iv) F * is a partial order. Note that the first three conditions imply that F is a relation, and that the last condition additionally imposes that it is acyclic.
In Definition 10 we transform a blockchain B = T 1 · · · T n into a Petri net N R (B), where R is an arbitrary relation between transactions. Although any relation R ensures that N R (B) is an occurrence net (Lemma 11), our main results hold when R is a strong swappability relation. The transformation works as follows: the i-th transaction in B is rendered as a transition (T i , i) in N R (B), and transactions related by R are transformed into concurrent transitions. Technically, this concurrency is specified as a relation < between transitions, such that (T i , i) < (T j , j) whenever i < j, but T i and T j are not related by R. The places, the weight function, and the initial marking of N R (B) are chosen to ensure that the firing ot transitions respects the relation <.
Definition 10 (From blockchains to Petri nets). Let B = T 1 · · · T n , and let R be a binary relation between transactions. We define the Petri net N R (B) = (P, Tr, F, m 0 ) as follows:
Example 13. Consider the following transactions:
P w g |= r T g P r g |= r T g These sets are safe approximations of their respective transactions (actually, if there are reachable states σ, σ ′ such that σCx = 0 = σ ′ Cy, they are the least ones). By Definition 8, we have that: Figure 7 , where t f = (T f , 1), t h = (T h , 2), and t g = (T g , 3). Note that t g can only be fired after t f , while t h can be fired independently from t f and t g . This is coherent with the fact that T h is swappable with both T f and T g , while T f and T g are not swappable.
The construction in Definition 10 ensures that the obtained Petri net is always an occurrence net:
Lemma 11. N R (B) is an occurrence net, for all R and B.
Step firing sequences Our main result (Theorem 13) establishes a correspondence between the concurrent and the serial execution of transactions. Since the semantics of serial executions is given in terms of blockchain states σ, to formalise this correspondence it is useful to use the same semantics domain also for concurrent executions. This is obtained in two steps. First, we define concurrent executions of B as the step firing sequences (i.e. finite sequences of sets of transitions) of the occurrence net N # (B). Then, we give a semantics to step firing sequences, in terms of blockchain states.
We 
Concurrent execution of transactions
We now define how to execute transactions in parallel. We will then exploit this notion in order to associate step firing sequences with state updates of the blockchain. Intuitively, transactions are executed in isolation, ideally on different cores. Updates of the store are recorded, but not propagated to other transactions (similarly to Fabric). Then, if the changes are mutually disjoint, they are merged. Note that we can always represent the state σ ′ = T σ as the application of an update π to σ. An update collector is a function Π taking a state σ and a transaction T, and returning an update π = Π(σ, T) which maps (at least) the updated qualified keys to their new values. In practice, an update collector can be obtained by instrumenting the run-time environment of smart contracts, so to record the differences created in the blockchain state by the execution of transactions. Our formalization of update collectors abstracts from the implementation details of such an instrumentation:
Definition 11 (Update collector). We say that a function Π is an update collector when ∀σ, T : T σ = σ (Π(σ, T) ).
There exists a natural ordering of collectors, which extends the ordering between state updates (i.e., set inclusion, when interpreting them as sets of substitutions): namely, Π ⊑ Π ′ holds when ∀σ, T : Π(σ, T) ⊆ Π ′ (σ, T). The following lemma characterizes the least update collector w.r.t. this ordering.
Lemma 12 (Least update collector). Let
The merge of two state updates is the union of the corresponding substitutions; to avoid collisions, we make the operator undefined when the domains of the two updates overlap.
Definition 12 (Merge of state updates). Let π 0 , π 1 be state updates. When keys(π 0 ) ∩ keys(π 1 ) = ∅, we define π 0 ⊕ π 1 as follows:
The merge operator enjoys the commutative monoidal laws, and can therefore be extended to (finite) sets of state updates.
The semantics of a step U = { (T 1 , 1) , . . . , (T n , n)} in σ is obtained by applying to σ the merge of the updates Π(σ, T i ), for all i ∈ 1..n -whenever the merge is defined. The semantics of a step firing sequence is then obtained by folding that of its steps.
Definition 13 (Semantics of step firing sequences). Let U be a step of N R (B). We define the semantics of U, for a given update collector Π and blockchain state σ, as follows:
and we extend the semantics to step firing sequences as follows:
Example 14. Let t f , t g , and t h be as in Example 13, and let σ be such that σCx = σCy = 0. Since
Note that, for all σ:
In other words, the serial execution of T f and T h (in both orders) is equal to their concurrent execution, and similarly for T g and T h . Instead, for all σ such that σCx = σCy = 0:
So, the concurrent execution of T f and T g may differ from serial executions (in any order). This is coherent with the fact that, in the occurrence net in Figure 7 , transitions t f and t g are not concurrent.
Concurrent execution of blockchains
We now establish our main result (Theorem 13), which relates serial executions of transactions to concurrent ones. Concurrent execution are rendered as step firing sequences. Item (a) establishes a confluence property: if two step firing sequences lead to the same marking, then they also lead to the same blockchain state. Item (b) states that the blockchain, interpreted as a sequence of transitions, is a step firing sequence, and it is maximal (i.e., its transitions include all the transitions of the net). Finally, item (c) ensures that executing maximal step firing sequences is equivalent to executing serially the blockchain.
(a) if U and U ′ are step firing sequences from m 0 to m, then
} is a maximal step firing sequence; (c) for all maximal step firing sequences U, and for all reachable σ,
Note that, since # W R ⊆ # holds by Lemma 9, then the implications of Theorem 13 also apply to N # W R (B).
Example 15. Recall B = T f T h T g and N # (B) from Example 13, let U = {t f , t h }{t g }, and let σ be such that σCx = σCy = 0. As predicted by item (c) of Theorem 13, we have that:
We have that U and U ′ lead to the same marking, where the places (t f , * ), (t g , * ) and (t h , * ) contain one token each, while the other places have no tokens. By item (a) of Theorem 13 we conclude that
Example 16 (Lottery, revised). Recall T r1 and T r2 of TinyLottery2 from Example 11. Let B = T j1 T j2 T r1 T r2 T w , where:
Since T r1 #T r2 , the occurrence net N # (B) is the one in Figure 8 . Let U = {T j1 }{T j2 }{T r1 , T r2 }{T w }, i.e. T r1 and T r2 are executed concurrently. From item (c) of Theorem 13 we have that this concurrent execution is equivalent to the serial execution of B.
Exploiting our results in practice We now discuss how to apply Theorem 13 to improve the performances of both miners and validators in Ethereum. Miners perform the following steps to mine a block (we omit the proof-of-work, since it is independent from our optimization):
(1) gather from the network a set of transactions, and put them in an arbitrary linear order B, which is the mined block; (2) compute the relation # W R on B, using a suitable static analysis for read/written keys; (3) construct the occurrence net N # W R (B); (4) execute transactions concurrently according to the occurrence net, exploiting the available parallelism. Note that in the concrete setting, the static analysis of item (2) should be applied to the new contracts that have been published in B. Although in our calculus we have omitted dynamic creation of contracts, our results still apply to this case. Indeed, the static analysis does not need to inspect the Solidity code of the contract, but it just needs the EVM code, which is published on the blockchain.
The behaviour of validators is almost identical to that of miners, except that in step (1), rather than choosing the order of transaction, they adhere to the ordering of the mined block B (further, they do not perform the proof-of-work). Note that in the last step, validators can execute any maximal step firing sequence which is coherent with their degree of parallelism: item (c) of Theorem 13 ensures that the resulting state is equal to the state obtained by the miner.
A key difference between our approach and [6, 18] is that in our case miners only need to write transactions on the blockchain (as in the actual Ethereum), while in [6, 18] they also need to embed the dependencies graph, which is essential to ensure that validators can reconstruct the same schedule of transactions. Therefore, our approach is compatible with the current Ethereum, while [6, 18] would require a soft-fork.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a static approach to improve the performance of Ethereum nodes by concurrently executing transactions. We start by introducing TinySol, a core contract calculus inspired by Solidity. After formalizing its semantics, we define the sequential semantics of a blockchain as a function which maps each contract to its state. Based upon this semantics, we characterise swappable transactions: two adjacent transactions are such when inverting their order does not affect the state of the blockchain. Since swappability is undecidable, we introduce a stricter relation, called strong swappability, which just relies on static approximations of the sets of keys read/written by transactions. We build upon this notion to study when transactions can be executed concurrently. To this purpose, we introduce a translation from blocks of transactions to occurrence nets, a classic model of true concurrency. Concurrent executions of a block of transactions are rendered as step firing sequences in the associated occurrence net. Our main technical result, Theorem 13, shows that these concurrent executions are semantically equivalent to the sequential execution. We discuss how this result can be exploited in practice to optimize Ethereum miners and validators. Compared to other approaches proposed in literature, ours has the benefit of being compatible with the current implementation of Ethereum, without requiring (soft or hard) forks.
Comparing TinySol and Solidity Aiming at minimality, TinySol makes some simplifications with respect to Solidity. A first difference is that our model assumes the set of contracts to be fixed, while in Ethereum new contracts can be created at run-time. Users create contracts by publishing special transactions, which specify the EVM code of the contract procedures. As noted in Section 5, this difference does not affect the applicability of our optimization technique, since miners and validators are supposed to statically analyse the EVM code of the new contracts found in each block.
A second difference is that Ethereum features a "gas" mechanism to ensure that all procedure calls terminate. When sending a transaction, users deposit into it some cryptocurrency, to be paid to the miner which appends the transaction to the blockchain. Each computation step performed by the miner consumes part of this deposit; when the deposit reaches zero, the miner stops executing the transaction. At this point, all the effects of the transaction (except the payment to the miner) are rolled back. For simplicity, in TinySol we do not model the gas mechanism: we just ensure that non-terminating calls have an undefined semantics, so that they are rolled back by rule [Tx2] . We stress that the gas mechanism does not affect our optimization technique: since "out-of-gas" exceptions roll back the transaction and transfer some currency to a miner, it suffices to ensure that static analyses of read/written keys always include the balance of the caller.
Two minor differences between TinySol and Solidity concern time constraints and fallback procedures. In Ethereum, contracts can implement time constraints by using the block publication time, accessible via the variable block.timestamp. In TinySol we do not record timestamps in the blockchain; still, contracts can implement time constraints by using oracles, like e.g. Clock within TinyLottery. Our optimization technique can deal with time constraints: it is enough to assume that the first transaction in a block is that of an oracle who writes the key block.timestamp. Finally, Solidity contracts have a fallback procedure, i.e. an unnamed procedure with no arguments, which is implicitly invoked when the procedure name specified in the transaction does not match any of the procedures in the contract. Although we do not model this feature in TinySol, static analyses of read/written keys can easily approximate its behaviour.
Future works As a future work we plan to perform an experimental assessment of our technique on the Ethereum blockchain, by implementing a static analysis of EVM bytecode. A first goal of this evaluation will be to detect strongly swappable transactions, and measure their occurrence, so to give a hint on the impact of parallelization of transactions. A second goal is to implement our parallelization technique in an Ethereum node, and to evaluate its effectiveness. In particular, we aim at estimating if the (small) overhead introduced in nodes is compensated by a gain in terms of throughput. The experiments in [18] already suggest that parallelization may lead to a significant improvement of the performance of nodes: their benchmarks on a selection of representative contracts show an overall speedups of 1.33x for miners and 1.69x for validators, using only three cores. A relevant line of research is to study program transformations to increase the degree of concurrency. For instance, we have seen in Example 16 that a simple transformation of our TinyLottery is enough to parallelize some of its procedures. Generalising this approach would lead to further improvements of the efficiency of Ethereum. Domain-specific languages designed to foster parallelization of the procedures in a contract would be another tool to reach this goal. 
A ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES
In this appendix we illustrate the expressiveness of TinySol through a series of examples.
An escrow contract In Figure 9 we program a simple escrow contract, which allows a buyer to deposit some funds to the contract and later authorize their transfer to a seller. Further, the seller can authorize a full refund to the buyer, in case there is some problem with the purchase. If buyer and seller do not find an agreement, they can resort to an external authority, which decides how the initial deposit is split among them (retaining a fee).
The procedure init initializes three keys: buyer (the sender of the transaction), seller and oracle (passed as parameters). The guard ensures that init can be called at most once. The procedures pay and refund authorize, respectively, the fund transfer to the seller or to the buyer; their guards ensure that a participant cannot authorize a transfer to herself. Either buyer and seller can call dispute, which in turns calls the procedure openDispute of the contract at address oracle. A possible contract with this procedure is Oracle in Figure 9 : there, openDispute just bounds the key escrow to the address of the contract caller (TinyEscrow). The oracle resolves the dispute by calling the procedure closeDispute: its parameter z is the fraction of the deposit which goes to the buyer; 1% of the deposit goes to the oracle as fee. Note that, if buyer or seller call pay or refund before the oracle calls closeDispute, then the latter invocation just results in a reset of the key escrow.
A Ponzi scheme In Figure 10 we implement a Ponzi scheme, i.e. a contract where users invest money, and can redeem their investment (plus interests) if enough users invest enough money in the contract afterwards. In particular, we consider a scheme which pays back users in order of arrival; this kind of Ponzi schemes gained some popularity in the early stage of Ethereum, with many dozens of different instances [8] .
The procedure init sets the contract owner, and initializes to 0 the key n, which counts the total number of investors, and p, which counts the number of investors who have been paid. The procedure join allows users to invest money, and distributes the new investment among all the other users who have not been paid so far. The procedure exploits the key-value store to maintain an array of investors. At line 14, the key ?n (i.e., the current value of n) is bound to a pair, which contains the address of the new investor, and the invested amount. We use fst and snd to access the first and second element of a pair, respectively. When a new user joins the scheme, the owner receives 1/10 of the value transferred along with the call (line 16). At lines 17-19, the procedure scans the array of unpaid users, starting from the oldest entry. As long as the balance is enough, each user receives twice the amount she invested. Note that ?p denotes the value bound to p (i.e., the index of the first unpaid user), while ??p denotes the pair (sender, value) associated to that user.
An extended wallet In Figure 11 we refine the wallet contract in Example 1. The contract TinyWallet has two procedures: init, which initializes the contract owner, and pay, which transfers amount units of currency from the contract to the account dst. At line 2, the procedure checks if the key owner is defined; if not, it means that the contract is still in the initial state where all keys (except balance) are undefined, and in this case it binds the key owner to the sender of the transaction. At line 5, the procedure aborts if the caller is not the contract owner, or if the caller transfers some currency along with the call, or if the contract balance is not enough. At line 7, if the key ?dst is not bound yet, then it is set to amount. Otherwise, at line 8 the old value is incremented of amount. Finally, line 9 transfers amount units of currency to the recipient.
B PROOFS
Lemma 1. For all P ⊆ P: (i) ∼ P is an equivalence relation; (ii) if
Proof. Items (i) and (ii) are trivial. The inclusion ∼ P ⊆ ∼ is trivial, and ∼ ⊆ ∼ P , follows from item (ii). □
Proof. Straightforward from the fact that semantics of statements in Figure 2 is a function, and it only depends on the blockchain states after the execution of B and B ′ , which are equal in any σ
Proof. By definition, ≃ ⇄ is the least equivalence relation closed under the rules:
Let B ≃ ⇄ B ′ . We have to show B ∼ B ′ . We proceed by induction on the rules above. The case for rules [≃0] and [≃1] follows by the fact that ∼ is an equivalence relation (Lemma 1) and hence reflexive. Therefore, by two applications of Lemma 2:
Proof. Item (a). For the case • = w, let P |= w T and P ⊆ P ′ . Let Q be such that Q ∩ P ′ = ∅. We have to show that T ∼ Q ϵ. Since P ⊆ P ′ , it must be Q ∩ P = ∅. Then, since P |= w T, it must be T ∼ Q ϵ, as required. For the case • = r , let P |= r T and P ⊆ P ′ . We have to show that, for all B 1 , B 2 , if B 1 ∼ P ′ B 2 and B 1 ∼ Q B 2 , then B 1 T ∼ Q B 2 T. But this follows immediately by the fact that P ⊆ P ′ and P |= r T.
Item (b). Let R be such that R ∩ (P ∩ Q ) = ∅. Since P |= w T and (R \ P) ∩ P = ∅, it must be:
Similarly, since Q |= w T and (R \ Q ) ∩ Q = ∅, we have that:
By Definition 4, we conclude that:
Proof. By Definition 9, it must be:
So, since W (T 2 ) |= w T 2 , by Definition 7 we have:
and so, since ∼ W (T 1 ) is a congruence:
By Definition 9, it must be:
Then, by Lemma 14:
By simmetry and transitivity of ∼ (Lemma 1), we conclude:
Proof. By applying Lemma 15 twice:
by applying Definition 7 twice:
Then, since ∼ P is a congruence:
Summing up:
from which we obtain the thesis, since ∼ P =∼. □ 
Proof. Since π 1 ⊕ π 2 is defined, it must be keys(π 1 )∩keys(π 2 ) = ∅. Let p be a qualified key. We have two cases:
• p ∈ keys(π). Since keys(π) = keys(π 1 ) ∪ keys(π 2 ), we have two subcases: -p ∈ keys(π 1 ). Then, πp = π 1 p. By disjointness, p keys(π 2 ), and hence π 1 π 2 p = π 1 p.
Proof. By induction on |B 2 |. For the base case, it must be B 2 = ϵ and hence T 2 = ∅. Then, B 1 B 2 = B 1 and T 1 ∪ T 2 = T 1 . Therefore, the thesis coincides with the first hypothesis. For the induction case, it must be B 2 = B ′ 2 T, with |B ′ 2 | = n. Furthermore, it must be T 2 = {T} ∪ T ′ 2 , for some T ′ 2 such that B ′ 2 ◁ T ′ 2 . By the induction hypothesis:
Proof. A simple induction on |B|, using Definition 7 for the induction case. □
Proof. Let π 1 = Π( B 1 , T) and π 2 = Π( B 2 , T). By Definition 11, B 1 T = B 1 π 1 . Let p ∈ Q . We have two cases:
• p ∈ keys(π 2 ).
Let Π be a state updater, and let W be such that ∀T : W (T) |= w T. We say that Π and W are compatible when ∀σ, T : keys(Π(σ, T)) ⊆ W (T).
We extend the semantics of transactions (Definition 2) to finite multisets of transactions. Hereafter, we denote with [] the empty multiset, with [T 1 , . . . , T n ] the multiset containing T 1 , . . . , T n , and with A + B the sum between multisets, i.e. (A + B)(x) = A(x) + B(x) for all x.
Definition 15 (Semantics of multisets of transactions). We denote the semantics of a multiset of transactions T, in a state σ and an update collector Π, as T Π σ , where the partial function · Π σ is defined as:
Hereafter, we say that a multiset T is strongly swappable w.r.t.
Lemma 25. If T is strongly swappable w.r.t. # W R , B ◁ T and Π is compatible with W then, for all B 0 :
Proof. By induction on |B|. For the base case, it must be B = ϵ and T = ∅, and hence
By the induction hypothesis:
Note that:
Where π ′ T ′ ∈T ′ Π( B 0 , T ′ )). Let Π( B 0 , T) = π T . Since T is strongly swappable w.r.t. # W R and Π is compatible with W , it must be keys(π ′ ) ∩ keys(π T ) = ∅, and hence (π ′ ⊕ π T ) is defined. Then, it must be:
We have that: 
Proof. Trivial. □
We now formalize when a blockchain B is a serialization of a multiset of transactions T.
Definition 16 (Serialization of multisets of transactions). We define the relation ◁ between blockchains and multisets of transactions as follows:
The following theorem ensures that the parallel execution of strongly swappable transactions is equivalent to any sequential execution of them. Hereafter, we say that a multiset T is strongly swappable if ∀T ∈ T, ∀T ′ ∈ T − [T] : T#T ′ .
Theorem 27. If T is strongly swappable and B ◁ T, then, for all reachable σ: T Π ⋆ σ = B σ .
Proof. Direct by Lemmas 25 and 26. □
A parellelized blockchain B is a finite sequence of multisets of transactions; we denote with ϵ the empty sequence. We extend the semantics of multisets (Definition 15) to parallelized blockchains as follows.
Definition 17 (Semantics of parallelized blockchains). The semantics of parallelized blockchains is defined as follows:
We write B Π for B Π σ ⋆ , where σ ⋆ is the initial state.
We also extend the serialization relation ◁ (Definition 16) to parallelized blockchains.
Definition 18 (Serialization of parallelized blockchains). We define the relation ◁ between blockchains and parallelized blockchains as follows:
The following theorem states that our technique to parallelize the transactions in a blockchain preserves its semantics. Proof. By induction on the rule used for deriving B ◁ B.
• Rule: ϵ ◁ ϵ .
The thesis follows trivially as:
By Theorem 27, for some reachable σ ′ :
The thesis then follows immediately by the following:
Lemma 29. Let R be a binary relation between transactions, B = T 1 · · · T n , and N R (B) = (P, Tr, F, m 0 ). Then (Tr, < * ) is a partial order.
Proof. Transitivity and reflexivity hold by definition. For antisymmetricity, assume (T i , i) < * (T j , j) and (T j , j) < * (T i , i). Then, it is easy to verify that i ≤ j and j ≤ i, and so i = j. Since T i and T j are uniquely determined by i and j, we have that T i = T j . Therefore, (T i , i) = (T j , j), as required. □ Lemma 11. N R (B) is an occurrence net, for all R and B.
Proof. Items (i),(ii) and (iii) are easy to verify. For item (iv), note that it suffice to prove that F * is acyclic. So, assume, by contradiction, there is a sequence x = x 0 , x 1 , . . . x m such that (x i , x i+1 ∈ F) for all 0 ≤ i < m, and x 0 = x m with m > 0. Note that the above sequence alternates between transitions and places, and so, since m > 0 at least a place and at least a transition occur in x. Furthermore, a place between two transitions t, t ′ can exist only if t < t ′ . Therefore, for any two transitions t, t ′ occurring in x we have that t < * t ′ and t ′ < * t. So, if x contains at least two transitions, by Lemma 29, we have a contradiction. If only one transition t = (T, i) occurs in x, then there is a place of the form (t, t) occuring in x. Therefore, t < t, which implies i < i: contradiction. □ Lemma 30. Let N = (P, Tr, F, m 0 ) be an occurrence net. For all t, t ′ ∈ Tr, if t t ′ then • t ∩ • t ′ = ∅.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that p ∈ • t ∩ • t ′ with t t ′ . Then, {t, t ′ } ⊆ p • , and hence |p • | ≥ 2 -contradiction with constraint (ii) of the definition of occurrence nets. □ Lemma 31. Let N = (P, Tr, F, m 0 ) be an occurrence net, and let m be a reachable marking. Then: − −−− →. By contradiction, assume that ¬(T# W R T ′ ). Then, since i < j or j > i, by Definition 10 we would have that (T, i) < (T ′ , j) or (T ′ , j) < (T, i). Then, by Lemma 33 we obtain a contradiction. □ Definition 21. Let N R (B) = (P, Tr, F, m 0 ). We define the function α : Tr → Tx as α(T, i) = T. We then extend α to a function from steps to multisets of transactions as follows:
Finally, we extend α to finite sequences of steps as follows: α(ϵ) = ϵ α(UU) = α(U)α(U)
Lemma 39. Let N R (B) = (P, Tr, F, m 0 ), and let U be a step firing sequence. Then, for all Π, σ:
Proof. Define:
It suffice to show that ≃ ⊆ ≃ ′ . Note that ≃ ′ is a congruence satisfying:
But then, by Lemma 38, it follows that ≃ ′ also satisfies: (T, i) I (T ′ , j) =⇒ (T, i)(T ′ , j) ≃ ′ (T ′ , j)(T, i)
